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█ Abstract In this commentary we engage with L.A. Paul’s Transformative Experience as it relates to deci-
sion making. We consider why deciding whether to undergo a transformative experiences can feel so ago-
nizing yet also be so fun, whether people have any preferences to decide over in the first place, and who 
people even think they are. 
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█ Riassunto Decisioni trasformative e relative insoddisfazioni – In questo commento ci concentreremo su 
come il volume di L.A. Paul Transformative Experience affronta i processi decisionali. Esamineremo per-
ché la decisione se intraprendere un’esperienza trasformativa possa risultare così struggente ed essere al-
tresì divertente; se le persone abbiano in assoluto qualche preferenza nel prendere decisioni definitive e 
chi le persone persone ritengono di essere. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Esperienza trasformativa; Grandi decisioni; Costruzione delle preferenze; Teoria del sé; 
Sforzo mentale 
 

TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE IS AN IM-
PORTANT and engaging work on an im-
portant and engaging topic. One of its 
(many) commendable features is that it sub-
stantially engages with contemporary cogni-
tive science. 
 We largely grant Paul her central argu-
ments, and draw connections between her 
work and current research in cognitive sci-
ence and psychology. In Transformative Ex-
perience, Paul identifies two related in-
principle barriers to making the decision to 
undergo a transformative experience. Rough-
ly, the barriers are (i) people’s beliefs, prefer-
ences, and so on can radically change 
through a transformative experience, and (ii) 
it is impossible for people to correctly predict 
how the transformative experience will 
change them, and what they will be like on 
the other side of the experience. 
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We think Paul is correct to identify these 
two barriers to making decisions about trans-
formative experiences. In what follows, we 
wish to consider these barriers from the per-
spective of cognitive science. Specifically, we 
will examine: the particular agony of facing 
transformative decisions, the difficulty of 
predicting oneself in the future given changes 
in the environment, preference construction, 
and, lastly, the psychology of selves.  
 
█  Difficulties with difficulty 
 
Decisions about transformative experi-
ences are often agonizing.1 Accounting for 
the particular difficulty of big decisions is not 
necessary for Paul’s argument about the irra-
tionality of applying standard decision theory 
to transformative decisions, but it is worth 
considering in the light of Paul’s argument.2  
As a paradigmatic case of decision agony, 
consider Penelope, the long-suffering wife of 
Odysseus. Penelope describes her woes in 
waiting for her missing husband, while hold-
ing out against the suitors who compete for 
her: As everyone else in the house lies down to 
sleep comfortably, Penelope is «afflicted by 
some god with pain beyond all measure... 
[M]y mind pulls two directions – should I stay 
here besides my son, and keep things all the 
same...or should I marry one of them?».3 
The decision whether to continue on as be-
fore or radically alter one’s life-project is a 
wrenching experience. Many people facing a 
big decision find themselves trodding the 
same ground mentally in cycles, agonized and 
paralyzed. This experience can sometimes feel 
like working through a difficult puzzle, but is 
the difficulty of a puzzle the difficulty of a big 
decision? Penelope presumably will not reach 
a eureka moment if she only thinks about her 
choice long enough. There is simply the stark 
choice to be made. And when faced with the 
stark choice of a big decision, people often go 
out of their way to put it off or avoid it alto-
gether. People delay, or drift, or dice decisions 
into manageable chunks.4 
In considering the source of the agony of 
big decisions, it helps to imagine a decision-
making machine (DMM) that has particular 
beliefs (encoded as, say, probability distribu-
tions over states of the world) and goals (en-
coded as, say, utility functions). Suppose the 
DMM follows the basic maxim of acting to 
maximize its expected utility under its beliefs, 
and can calculate its prospects given its cur-
rent understanding of the world. We grant 
that Paul’s argument of the irrationality of 
transformative decisions would readily apply 
to this machine: The DMM cannot adequate-
ly simulate itself post a transformation of its 
epistemic states, or choose reasonably a point 
that is past a change of its central preferences, 
and therefore cannot rationally choose wheth-
er to alter its own self. But would the DMM 
agonize over this choice? This is not a ques-
tion about the phenomenology of agony, but a 
more focused concern of the sort that certain 
cognitive scientists busy themselves with: we 
want to understand the computational corre-
late of decision agony. 
A basic amplification account would iden-
tify the difficulty of big decisions with com-
putational costs. Evaluating a set of options 
requires keeping those options in memory, 
and simulating the resulting prospects of 
each option requires computational re-
sources, memory, and time. And much as cal-
culating the progression of a thousand stars 
is more computationally demanding than the 
bouncing of a single ball, so too considering a 
decision such as whether to leave one’s hus-
band or stay for the sake of the children may 
eat up a great deal of mental resources in 
spinning out and evaluating more detailed 
possible futures and sub-options within each 
future.5 If this account is true, the DMM 
could also be said to have greater difficulty 
with greater decisions, to the degree that the 
machine is spending more computing re-
sources. Such an account is tempting in its 
reduction, but faces several problems. First, 
there are many non-big decisions (and non-
decision mental simulations) that can be dif-
ficult in terms of computing resources but 
carry hardly any agony to them: One’s mind 
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may be taxed computationally by which of 
300 urns to choose in a convoluted math rid-
dle, but solving riddles can be enjoyable and 
fun even if mentally challenging. Second, 
many of the paradigmatic cases of big deci-
sions are simple and stark, but still carry ago-
ny. Penelope’s mind tugs two directions, not 
two thousand. The pro-and-con list for each 
option can also be rather short. The torment 
is not the memory cost of keeping the op-
tions and their features in mind, but bringing 
them to mind at all.  
A different and more naive kind of ampli-
fication account would suggest that the diffi-
culty of making a big decision is directly tied 
to the consequences of the decision: A game 
involving big sums weighs on the mind more 
heavily than a bet over a nickel. Changing 
the self certainly seems like large conse-
quence, so there’s agony to match. However, 
this account also presents problems. We can 
construct situations with big consequences 
but little mind-wrecking in their reckoning. 
Consider a game of selecting one of two iden-
tical doors to open, where some amount of 
gold is behind one door, and a pile of straw is 
hidden behind the other, but you have no 
idea which door is which.6 There is nothing 
to evaluate in this choice, as far as standard 
rational planning goes given that the connec-
tion between action and reward is unknown, 
and one simply picks a door, no matter the 
amount of gold.  
There may certainly be added agony and 
projected regret in imagining a future in 
which one selects the wrong door, in that the 
unpleasantness of not winning the gold is larg-
er than the pleasantness of winning the gold.7 
Such an explanation would sit on top of the 
fact that big stakes are involved. That is, it is 
not that large stakes are identified with agony 
in and of themselves, but rather that they lead 
to certain operations, such as simulating fu-
tures, with some of those futures being painful 
to hold in mind. But big decisions can involve 
simulating alternative futures that are all ben-
eficial, while still being tormenting. Do I want 
to keep with tradition and become a monk in 
my father’s buddhust monastery, or strike out 
on my own and to become a successful corpo-
rate lawyer? Neither option is negative per se, 
both might be tempting, but their juxtaposition 
creates the problem.  
Instead of super-sizing the troubles of or-
dinary decisions, we may find decision agony 
lurking in what makes big decisions unique. 
As Paul and others argue, transformative de-
cisions cause standard models of rational 
choice to break down. A “breakdown” ac-
count of the source of the agony suggests that 
the agony involved in transformative deci-
sions is caused by the fact that while big deci-
sions present themselves as if they are stand-
ard decisions, they are missing some of the 
key components needed for a standard deci-
sion-making module to work.  
Think of the way a garbled nonsense sen-
tence might be initially labeled for further 
processing by sentence-comprehension com-
putations, but with this processing breaking 
down since the input is not an actual sen-
tence. Perhaps a big decision presents itself 
initially as a standard selection scenario: it 
involves a set of alternatives of which one 
must select only one, and the alternatives 
have distinguishing properties that allow 
them to be evaluated. But past this initial 
stage, processing then breaks down. In this 
sense, the DMM might be said to be experi-
encing big decision difficulties, as it would 
hum along just fine for standard decisions 
but return an error when processing a big de-
cision. For example, this breakdown or error 
may happen because standard decision mak-
ing requires commensurable options, where-
as big decisions require comparing incom-
mensurable options.8 What dimensions or 
features can Penelope use to contrast remain-
ing faithful to her husband’s memory, with the 
destruction of his son’s livelihood? Or per-
haps, going back to Paul’s argument, the 
breakdown may be that the DMM cannot ra-
tionally simulate what the consequences of se-
lecting the different options will be,and rec-
ognizes this basic failure of its simulation.9 But 
a breakdown account is strange, in that it pos-
  McCoy & Ullman 
 
342 
its people may recognize the failure of their 
own processing, yet persist in this failure.  
A deeper problem for both the amplifica-
tion and breakdown accounts is that trans-
formative choices can be a lot of fun. So long 
as we don’t have to actually make them, that 
is. In previous work with Paul on modal pro-
spection, we asked many people to imagine 
making outlandish, life altering, transforma-
tive choices.10 While not the main focus of 
that study, the great majority of people re-
ported such imaginations highly enjoyable. 
Such fun poses a problem for basic amplifica-
tion accounts, since imagining and making a 
fictional choice summons the supposed cor-
relates of difficulty in a real choice but not 
their sting. This enjoyment is thorny for 
breakdown accounts as well. Reasoning 
through imagined transformative decisions 
should still cause a breakdown in processing 
(just as imagining reading a nonsense sen-
tence should not lead to comprehension), 
and yet if any faulty processing is occurring, 
it does not seem to bring agony.  
Imagining a choice and making a choice 
are not the same, but what is it about an ac-
tual choice that may drive the agony? Per-
haps real consequences sharpen the mind 
and force us to summon resources we other-
wise would not, going back to the simple am-
plification account. We do not rule out such 
a hypothesis, and it could be tested empiri-
cally, for example by having people lay out all 
their options and considerations in both a 
pretend-choice and a real-choice scenario. 
However, we think a different aspect of real 
choices may be in play: the fact that they 
cordon off the non-selected futures. Let us 
call this the gate-shutting account of decision 
difficulty. There may be intrinsic value and 
pleasure in having multiple possible paths 
still open for oneself, and a dreading of hav-
ing paths cut off. The term Torschlusspanik 
(gate-shut-panic) is ascribed to the general 
anxiety that as time passes opportunities are 
flying away, but we may be even more reluc-
tant to shut the gate ourselves. This account 
may explain why we delay and dither in a big 
decision, putting it off for a month when we 
could just as well make it today. It fits with 
the difficulty of relatively simple big deci-
sions, where all the options are known and all 
we are faced with is choosing and yet we 
cannot decide. It is in line with the fact that 
imagining a choice without actually making 
it is pleasurable.  
Of course, any choice is a cordoning off of 
some options. In this sense, perhaps we are 
back to the amplification account: small de-
cisions cut off a little bit of our possible fu-
ture, and big decisions cut off a lot. But in the 
same way that big decisions are characterized 
as sharply affecting core beliefs and desires,11 
transforming rather than evolving the self, so 
too the mind may only consider decisions as 
cordoning off futures in the case of big deci-
sions. The decision to snack on apples does 
not present itself to us as standing at a cross-
roads, forever cutting off the person that we 
would have been if only we had pears.12 Un-
like the accounts considered so far, such an 
abhorrence towards cordoning off does not 
fall out of a simple DMM, requiring addi-
tional considerations (such as a meta-
preference over option availability), and sug-
gesting that a simple DMM could not be said 
to be having big difficulties with big deci-
sions. 
 
█  Predictions and preferences 
 
We now move to discuss two other issues 
in psychology that relate to Transformative 
Experience: briefly, the difficulty of predict-
ing oneself in the future, especially given the 
role of the environment, and then, at more 
length, the construction of preferences. One 
way to read this psychology is as further em-
pirical motivation for the difficulty of choos-
ing transformative experiences. Another way 
to read this psychology, made salient by 
Paul’s work, is that even non-transformative 
decisions are more difficult than we might 
have thought.  We don’t intend to give any-
thing like a comprehensive review of even 
the parts of psychology that we discuss. Our 
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intent, instead, is to describe one or two rele-
vant experiments to give a flavor of the kind 
of work being done. 
Paul points in Transformative Experience to 
some of the work on failures of affective fore-
casting, and it’s certainly true that people some-
times systematically fail to predict their future 
feelings.13 We here briefly comment on a fea-
ture that can make such predictions particular-
ly difficult for transformative experiences. 
People find it difficult to make predic-
tions about themself in different states,14 but 
a large influence on people’s behavior is not 
simply their own state, but also the environ-
ment. Post a transformative experience, not 
only are you a different person, but your 
world writ large has probably changed in 
dramatic ways too. For example, the people 
that you interact with regularly may be dif-
ferent, the demands on your time may be dif-
ferent, or baby crying may be suddenly inter-
rupting your slumber. 
The problem, however, is that when 
thinking about the causes of behavior or pre-
dicting behavior, people tend to overweight 
the dispositional, as opposed to the situa-
tional, causes of behavior.15 People’s (future) 
behavior not only depends strongly on the 
particular environment, but they have a 
strong disposition to believe that dispositions 
– rather than environments – should be the 
main input to their predictions. And when it 
comes to environment change, people prob-
ably do not have a good sense of how their 
environment will change post a transforma-
tive experience. 
Psychology suggests that making forecasts 
about preferences is an extremely non-trivial 
ask, especially given changes in the environ-
ment. But there’s a deeper issue with respect 
to preferences. One big theme that has 
emerged from work on behavioral decision 
making is that we often don’t have a prede-
fined preference between the alternatives 
that we are considering. Instead, our prefer-
ences are constructed on the spot. 
Think back to your days as a student at-
tending lectures. The professor announces 
that they are going to give a poetry reading 
the following week. How much would you 
like to go to such a performance, and bathe 
in the sounds of “Leaves of Grass”? Forget 
making a fine-grained judgment, is this 
something that would be a positive experi-
ence or a negative experience for you? It 
turns out that for many people whether this 
experience is perceived as positive or nega-
tive depends on how the experience was ini-
tially framed. People who were first asked 
whether they’d pay $10 to attend the reading 
saw it as more positive than those who were 
first asked whether they’d attend if paid 
$10.16  
Most psychology experiments do not in-
volve poetry-reading professors,17 but there 
are many other studies that demonstrate that 
people’s choices change depending on the 
means of elicitation. The most well-known of 
these show that people’s preference between 
two gambles reverses, depending on whether 
you ask people to choose between the gambles 
or indicate how much they are willing to pay 
for each gamble, demonstrating that people 
probably did not have a clear preference be-
tween the gambles before being asked.18  
What should we make of preference con-
struction in thinking about transformative 
experiences? One issue raised by preference 
construction is that Paul’s account of trans-
formative experiences assumes that people 
have preferences that change in a way impos-
sible to predict, but this work suggests that 
people never had such stable preferences in 
the first place. This, of course, potentially 
makes transformative experiences even more 
difficult to rationally decide about. Some of 
Paul’s worries about the rational account of 
transformative decision making may also 
rear their heads for non-transformative deci-
sions preference construction. 
 
█  The psychology of selves 
 
Research in psychology tells us that pref-
erences may be unstable or difficult to pre-
dict even in fairly simple, well-controlled set-
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tings. But, Paul’s Transformative Experience 
doesn’t deal with the kind of choices com-
mon in a lab setting, such as between more or 
less risky monetary gambles. Rather, the 
choices are about the different selves that 
you might become post the transformative 
experience. 
Much of the contemporary work in psy-
chology on how people think about the self 
has focused on how connected people feel to 
their future self, and the implications this has 
for how they make intertemporal tradeoffs.19 
To give two examples, people who feel more 
connected to their future self exhibit more 
patience,20 and greater perceived similarity to 
the future self is associated with higher life 
satisfaction ten years later.21 
Beyond how connected people feel to 
their future self, a more basic question is how 
people conceptualize and represent the no-
tion of a self. What are the important fea-
tures that make up people’s self concept, and 
should it even be thought of in terms of fea-
tures? One possible answer to this question 
comes from Chen and colleagues.22 In one 
study, they show participants a feature (e.g. 
your intelligence level) and ask what other 
features of their self it causes (e.g. does it 
cause your degree of shyness, your aesthetic 
preferences, your height), as well as how 
much their self would be disrupted if the fea-
ture is interfered with. They find that the de-
gree of disruption is predicted by how causally 
central a feature is. They thus argue that peo-
ple’s self-concept is much like many other con-
cepts, in that what matters is the structure of 
the causal relations between its features. 
We think the existing work in psychology 
on how people represent and reason about 
the self is already potentially useful for phi-
losophers thinking about such issues. But, in-
spired by Transformative Experience, we also 
believe there are many exciting empirical 
questions to be asked in this area. How do 
people think about distances over the space 
of selves? For example, people may be reluc-
tant to change into a self that is far away 
from their current self, even if it’s a wonder-
ful self otherwise. How do judgments about 
your present self in various states compare to 
judgments about your future self? For exam-
ple, one can ask people for judgments about 
how different they will be in five years, versus 
how different they are  when angry. How do 
people’s beliefs about their self inform their 
decisions about whether to undergo a trans-
formative experience, and how do such deci-
sions change their beliefs about their self? 
Given the difficulties involved in trans-
formative experiences, we think it’s appro-
priate to end with interrogatives rather than 
bold claims, but we look forward to philoso-
phers and psychologists making progress on 
such questions. Don’t you?   
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